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Abstract. This paper proposes a cybersecurity control framework for blockchain ecosystems, drawing 
from risks identified in the practitioner and academic literature. The framework identifies thirteen risks 
for blockchain implementations, ten common to other information systems and three risks specific to 
blockchains: centralization of computing power, transaction malleability, and flawed or malicious smart 
contracts. It also proposes controls to mitigate the risks identified; some were identified in the literature 
and some are new. Controls that apply to all types of information systems are adapted to the different 
components of the blockchain ecosystem. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we develop a framework for cybersecurity controls for blockchain 
ecosystems. The ability of blockchains to store immutable records has made them 
104   The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research                                                               Vol. 19 
attractive for many business applications. Although heralded as an ecosystem with 
tamper-proof mechanisms, disclosed cyberattacks on blockchains have made 
evident that, as is true for any other system, blockchains should implement 
internal controls to ensure the security of the information they hold. Among the 
many controls for blockchains, given their decentralized and multiuser nature, 
cybersecurity controls are of the utmost importance. 
Although cybersecurity controls in blockchains are relevant to many 
professionals—from information technology managers to software developers—
accountants have a primary role in understanding, implementing, and assessing 
the strength of those controls. Accountants are responsible for ensuring the 
reliability of the information reported in financial statements; the interactions 
between blockchains and accounting information systems make accountants 
responsible for overseeing blockchain controls. Similarly, auditors are responsible 
for evaluating blockchain controls to the extent that blockchains are integrated 
with financial reporting. Although standards and guidance are lacking, external 
auditors are already offering attestation services for independent evaluations of 
blockchain controls (Rapoport, 2018). 
Control frameworks are purposely broad because they intend to apply to any type 
of information system. As a result, there is little guidance on controls specifically 
designed for blockchains. To the best of our knowledge, only ISACA (2019) has 
issued formal guidelines on the audit of blockchains. One of the reasons for this 
lack of guidance for blockchain controls is that most controls apply to any type of 
information systems. For instance, access controls should be implemented and 
enforced regardless of the type of application. Another reason for the lack of 
guidance for blockchain controls is the fast pace at which the blockchain industry 
is developing. Although blockchains share some of the cybersecurity controls 
required for any information systems, blockchains have unique characteristics that 
warrant special consideration of cybersecurity controls specifically designed for 
the blockchain ecosystem. 
To develop our framework, we first conducted a comprehensive review of the 
practitioner literature to identify publicly disclosed attacks on blockchains. We 
supplemented this review with an examination of academic articles to identify the 
vulnerabilities of blockchains. These assessments served as a starting point for 
identifying risks to the different components of the blockchain ecosystem. The 
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framework includes different components of the ecosystem, such as oracles and 
arbitrators because, although they are external to the core blockchain technology, 
the information they provide impacts the reliability of the information stored in 
the blockchain.  
The framework emphasizes risks and controls rather than the technology behind 
blockchains; however, we provide an appendix describing cybersecurity threats. 
The appendix is intended to facilitate the understanding of cyber threats for 
accountants and accounting students with limited technical knowledge. This 
framework can be used to develop standards for blockchain audits, to foster 
academic research in blockchain cybersecurity controls, to introduce students and 
faculty to the blockchain ecosystem, and to guide updates in the accounting 
curriculum. In addition, this framework contributes to prescriptive knowledge by 
identifying risks and proposing associated controls that can inform design science 
research in blockchain. Prescriptive knowledge, as the name implies, gives 
instructions and recommendations on how to accomplish a goal (Gregor and 
Hevner, 2013). Design science research can use this framework when designing 
real world blockchain applications. 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief explanation 
of the different components of the blockchain ecosystem. This section aims to 
provide the necessary background for understanding the interaction among 
blockchain components. The literature review section describes the review of the 
practitioner literature reporting cybersecurity attacks on blockchains. We present a 
comprehensive list of known blockchain security events, including attacks on 
blockchain instances, in Appendix 2. The risks and controls section describes 
cybersecurity risks to blockchain ecosystems and propose controls to mitigate the 
risks. We summarize the controls in a cybersecurity control framework. Finally, 
we discuss the limitations and potential areas for research. 
2. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM  
Control frameworks organize and categorize internal controls to reasonably ensure 
that financial reporting is reliable and that operations are effective, efficient, and 
in compliance with laws and regulations. The cybersecurity control framework we 
propose, includes the blockchain itself and additional components of the 
blockchain ecosystem. A blockchain stores data (typically, transactions) in a set of 
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blocks linked together by commonly agreed rules. For the blockchain to be of any 
use, there are many other components (such as the users or transaction 
stakeholders, the validating rules and consensus mechanisms, the interfaces with 
the physical world) that must interact together as a system. In this paper, we refer 
to such a set of interacting components as a blockchain ecosystem. We provide 
below a brief description of the typical components in a blockchain ecosystem. 
The first public application of a blockchain, Bitcoin, initially included only two 
components, nodes and wallets. Wallets are the means for owners to keep and 
transfer their tokens, and nodes are the bookkeepers. Nodes make up the backbone 
of a blockchain, as each node keeps a copy of the ledger; that is the reason why a 
blockchain is described as a distributed ledger. As blockchains have evolved to 
support different transactions, additional components have been added to the 
ecosystem. Table 1 describes the tasks performed by the components of the 
ecosystem. 
Component Tasks 
Node Receives transaction from wallets or other nodes. Validates transactions. 
Groups transactions into blocks. Appends blocks to the chain. Keeps a copy 
of the entire blockchain. 
Wallets Sends or receives tokens through simple transactions or transactions 
embedded in smart contracts. 
Smart contract Executes a transaction when the conditions programmed are met. 
Oracles Provides information to the blockchain about events in the real world. 
Arbitrators Referees disputes in transactions. 
Web exchanges Executes transactions on behalf of wallet owners. 
Table 1. Components and tasks in a blockchain ecosystem 
The sequence of recording transactions in a typical blockchain starts when a 
sender transfers tokens to a receiver. The wallet of the owner broadcasts the 
transaction to several nodes, which in turn rebroadcast the transaction to other 
nodes; as a consequence, nodes do not receive transactions at the same time. 
Nodes validate the transactions received by verifying, among other things, that the 
sender owns enough tokens to transfer to the receiver. In addition to validating 
transactions, nodes group transactions into new blocks. Because there can be 
delays in propagating the information, the transactions grouped by each node can 
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be different. Figure 1 provides a broad overview of the actions of wallets and 
nodes in a basic blockchain. 
 
Figure 1. Actions of wallets and nodes 
A node appends a newly created block (N+1) to the last validated block (N), 
creating a chain of blocks from which blockchain gets its name. When block N+1 
is added to the blockchain by a node, other nodes verify that all the transactions in 
the block are valid, and if so, append the new block to their local copy of the 
blockchain. If the block has invalid transactions, the nodes reject the proposal to 
append block N+1 to the blockchain, keeping N as the latest block in the chain. 
Blocks have two distinct parts: the body that contains the transactions and the 
header that contains information about the current block and the previous block. 
The immutability of records in a blockchain is achieved by using unique 
identifiers calculated with mathematical functions (called hash functions) applied 
to the content of the blocks. Block N stores in its header a unique identifier of the 
content of its own body. The header of block N also includes a unique identifier of 
the entire content (body and header) of block N-1. The unique identifier can only 
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be calculated based on the given content and not with any other content; even a 
change in a single bit results in a different unique identifier. The immutability of 
the records in a blockchain is achieved because identifiers can be recalculated and 
compared with the original identifier stored in the header of blocks at any time. 
When the original and recalculated identifiers match, the content has not been 
altered; when the identifiers do not match, the content has been altered. Figure 2 
depicts the structure of blocks and the unique identifiers based on the contents.  
 
Figure 2. Structure of blocks and unique identifiers 
In blockchains, tokens are unique; the transfer of tokens from one owner to 
another is managed by validating the ownership of the tokens with the digital 
signature of the owner. Tokens may represent digital cryptocurrencies, such as 
Bitcoin's BTC, Ethereum's Ether or Ripple's XRP. More generally, tokens are 
digital assets that may represent tangible assets such as diamonds, real estate, food 
and goods in a supply chain or kilowatts of energy. Tokens might also represent 
intangible assets, such as copyrights, software licenses, voting rights, identity 
management and academic credit validation. When a person receives tokens, the 
tokens are “locked” with the digital signature of the receiver, making the receiver 
the owner of the tokens. The tokens can only be redeemed (“unlocked”) with the 
owner’s digital signature (Antonopoulos, 2017). When a sender creates a 
transaction, the sender unlocks the tokens with his/her digital signature and 
transfers the ownership of the tokens to the receiver. 
When tokens represent assets related to the physical world, the blockchain system 
needs a mechanism to interact and retrieve information from the physical world. 
For instance, if a blockchain tracks the supply chain of electronics components, it 
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may require access to the systems of the manufacturers, transportation companies, 
customs, and any other intermediary, until the electronic components reach their 
final destination. Oracles are the blockchain component tasked with providing a 
blockchain with information about the physical world. 
Private, permissioned blockchains, may add a component known as a Membership 
Service Provider (MSP) to validate the identity of the members, as well as to 
manage access and permissions. For instance, an MSP manages which members 
can access read-only, validate transactions, and create and append blocks.  
3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
We started our inquiry by conducting a comprehensive literature review to 
identify publicly disclosed attacks on blockchains. A search was conducted of 
both academic and practitioner literature to identify publications concerning 
various combinations of the terms “blockchain” and synonyms for “attack.” 
Several databases, including ProQuest, were searched, as was Google Scholar. 
Although hundreds of publications mentioning blockchain and some notion of 
attack were found, most of these concerned how blockchain could be used to deter 
attacks, rather than how blockchain instances have been attacked. A final set of 66 
publications, scholarly articles, blog postings, practitioner white papers, and web  
pages, discussing a total of 36 events, were thoroughly analyzed to appreciate 
what is known publicly concerning attacks on blockchain. Of course, as is true 
with any analysis of attacks on business firms, it may be true that some (or even 
most) of the actual attacks that have occurred have not been publicized. This 
literature review can inform design science research by identifying one of the 
problems that blockchains need to solve, namely protecting the integrity of the 
data. 
Appendix 2 summarizes the information obtained about publicly-acknowledged 
attacks on blockchain instances. Some sources that did not add significant 
information beyond those shown have been omitted. Table 2 summarizes the 
types of attacks publicly disclosed. Most of the incidents reported (eleven 
incidents) were attacks using centralization of computing power. Attacks on 
wallets included four incidents of corporate phishing, three incidents of loss or 
theft of private key, one incident of usurped public key, and three incidents of 
transaction malleability. Attacks on web exchanges included four incidents of loss 
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or theft of private key, one incident of usurped public key, and three incidents on 
distributed denial of service. There were two incidents reported on smart contracts 
with flawed or malicious code. Four reports did not provide detailed information 
about the nature of the attacks experienced. 
Component Risk Incident number Total number     
of incidents 
Nodes Centralization of computing 
power 
2, 3, 9, 10, 26, 27, 28,29, 31, 
33, 35 
11 
Wallets Corporate phishing 14, 16, 24, 32 4 
Loss or theft of private key 12, 15, 25 3 
Usurped public key 13 1 
Transaction malleability 1, 11, 17 3 
Web 
exchanges 
Loss or theft of private key 19, 22, 23, 36 4 
Usurped public keys 18 1 
Distributed denial of service 4, 5, 7 3 
Smart 
contract 
Flawed or malicious code 8, 30 2 
Not 
disclosed 
 6, 20, 21, 34 4 
Table 2. Types of Blockchain Attacks 
From the academic literature, other types of attacks emerged.  Li et al. (2017) 
identify the different risks related to blockchain as 51% vulnerability, private key 
security, double spending, transaction privacy leakage, criminal smart contracts 
and vulnerabilities in smart contracts. ISACA (2019) also provides guidance on 
the risks associated with blockchain implementations. Different from Li et al. 
(2017), who focus on attacks of blockchains that are already implemented, the 
ISACA guidelines (2019) for blockchain auditing consider the entire life cycle of 
a blockchain, including pre-implementation and governance. Although the ISACA 
guidelines are broader than those from Li et al. (2017), they both consider attacks 
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to the blockchain itself, rather than the blockchain ecosystem. The following 
sections expand on the attacks identified in the review of the practitioner and 
academic literature and are the building blocks of the proposed cybersecurity 
control framework. 
4. RISK AND CONTROLS 
4.1. Distributed denial of service attacks 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack attempts to make a targeted system unavailable 
to its end users. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack uses many 
compromised computers in such an attempt (Saleh and Manaf, 2014). The 
compromised computers (laptops, desktops, Internet-of-Things devices) become 
“zombies” or “bots” that launch the attack upon the attacker’s command 
(Rahmani et al., 2009). Consequences of a DDoS attack can be platform 
unreachability, loss of productivity, and reputation damage (Greevink, 2018). 
Amazon Web Services (AWS, 2019) suggests four DDoS prevention controls: 1) 
Reduce attack surface area. This control limits the options for attackers by 
protecting information about ports, protocols and applications.  2) Define traffic 
baseline. This control refers to gathering information about normal and abnormal 
traffic. The pattern of normal traffic becomes the baseline and each incoming data 
packet is compared against it for classification. 3) Plan to scale. This control 
refers to the ability to scale bandwidth (transit) on demand to handle large volume 
of traffic and expand server capacity to increase or decrease the computation 
resources quickly. 4) Deploy sophisticated firewalls. This control refers to the 
installation of firewalls to protect against sophisticated application attacks such as 
SQL injection and cross-site request forgery. Prevention controls 3 (plan to scale) 
and 4 (firewalls) are useful not only in DDoS attacks; the ability to scale on 
demand can support peak operations and firewalls can filter phishing or virus 
attacks. Although a DDoS attack directed to a blockchain is unlikely, this attack 
can affect other components of the blockchain ecosystem, particularly oracles and 
exchanges. 
Based on the risk of a distributed denial of service attacks, we propose 
cybersecurity control 1: components of the blockchain should reduce the surface 
area of potential attacks and establish baselines on normal traffic. 
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4.2. Ransomware attacks 
Ransomware is software that takes control of the computer systems of its victims 
and demands that they pay ransoms to get control back. Ransomware usually 
infects computer systems through malware in email attachments or downloads 
from websites. There are two types of ransomware: 1) Locker-ransomware 
prevents its victims from accessing their computers, and 2) Crypto-ransomware 
encrypts the files of its victims, making the data unreadable (Sgandurra et al., 
2016).  
Blockchains have been associated with ransomware attacks primarily as payment 
methods. In July 2014, for instance, the ransomware CTB-Locker, which infected 
systems through an email attachment, requested ransom in Bitcoins (Security 
Alliance, 2017). More recently, in May 2017, the WannaCry crypto-ransomware, 
which infected around 230,000 computers by exploiting a vulnerability in 
Windows, requested ransom in Bitcoins (CERT-EU, 2017). Bitcoin may be the 
preferred method of payment of ransom (Popper, 2015) because accounts are 
anonymous (making it impossible to trace accounts back to owners who received 
the ransom) and transactions are irreversible (making it impossible for victims to 
reclaim the money paid for the ransom). An equivalent of $2,220,909 in Bitcoins 
have been used as payment method in ransomware attacks (Conti et al., 2018). 
Given the uncertainty and the risks of ransomware, some companies have been 
stockpiling Bitcoins to use for payments if they ever become victims of 
ransomware (Kshetri and Voas, 2017). 
A ransomware attack would be unlikely to incapacitate the typical public 
blockchain because the information in any captured nodes could easily be restored 
from uncaptured nodes. Because the typical public blockchain’s network contains 
many nodes, it is more resilient to a ransomware attack than the typical private 
blockchain’s network, which includes fewer. On the other hand, the other 
components of a blockchain ecosystem (oracles, arbitrators, wallets) can be 
targets of ransomware attacks and should implement general controls against 
them.   
Controls to protect against ransomware attacks range from preventing the attack 
from occurring to recovering data from backups without paying the ransom. A 
great many controls have been cited in the literature, including: performing 
regular backups, applying security patches and updates, deploying security 
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products, blocking popups, enforcing access control, performing and testing file 
recovery, disabling macros, avoiding suspicious emails and attachments, avoiding 
suspicious and unreliable URLs, implementing security awareness programs, and 
disabling unused wireless connections (Bridges, 2008; Kolodenker et al., 2017; 
Kumar and Kumar, 2013; Luo and Liao, 2007, 2009; Mohurle and Patil, 2017; 
Mustaca, 2014; Pathak and Nanded, 2016; Palisse et al., 2017; Prakash et al., 
2017). These general controls assist not only with protecting from ransomware 
attacks but also from other types of attacks.  
Based on the risk of ransomware attacks, we propose cybersecurity control 2: 
components of the blockchain ecosystem should implement general controls to 
prevent and recover from ransomware attacks. 
There is a variation on ransomware attack that involves demand for ransom by an 
attacker who has gained control over the majority of the computing power of a 
blockchain. This form of attack does not involve malware, but applies to 
blockchains in which the right to append a block to the chain is gained through 
computing power. We discuss this type of attacks in the section of centralization 
of computing power. 
4.3. Attacks using centralization of computing power 
Centralization of computing power is a risk for blockchains when nodes 
monopolize the right to append blocks to the chain due to their computing power. 
When the majority of the computing power in a blockchain’s network is 
centralized, whoever controls that power can with impunity discard a valid chain 
or substitute an invalid chain for a valid one. Attacks based on centralization of 
computing power (also known as majority attacks or 51% attacks) threaten 
blockchain immutability, which depends on a large number of nodes being able to 
independently validate transactions and blocks.  
An attack based on centralization of computing power takes advantage of implicit 
consensus, a mechanism for resolving temporary inconsistencies that can occur in 
a blockchain. Because of delays in the propagation of information in blockchains, 
it is possible for two nodes (A and B) to attempt simultaneously to add a block 
(N+1) to the last block (N) in a chain.  These two new blocks (N+1A and N+1B), 
usually will not contain exactly the same transactions, although both will be valid. 
This amounts to a temporary inconsistency in the blockchain.  The blockchain 
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now forks after block N and new blocks can be added to either side of the fork, 
the one following N+1A or the one following N+1B.  
To eliminate the inconsistency, implicit consensus specifies that the longer path 
will be deemed valid and the shorter path will be disregarded. Any node that can 
add a new block is free to decide which side of the fork to use; over time, one path 
will have more blocks added than the other. Eventually, nodes will stop adding 
blocks to the shorter path. Implicit consensus preserves the reliability of the 
information as long as nodes act independently and have about the same 
probability of adding new blocks to the chain. There is no need for formal 
approval or voting among nodes; when nodes append blocks to a path, the nodes 
are implicitly acknowledging its validity. 
The implicit consensus mechanism can become a means for attack on the 
blockchain when a node has a sufficiently high probability of adding a new block.  
A node with enough computing power can decide unilaterally which side of a fork 
will prevail. Moreover, it can create forks retrospectively or prospectively to 
manipulate the blockchain. 
To modify a chain retrospectively, a node may try to substitute a transaction that 
has already been validated (for instance, substituting transaction X with 
transaction X^') and has already been added to a block (for instance, to the block 
three blocks before the current last one [call this earlier block N-3]) by creating a 
fork just before N-3 (from block N-4). The fork will follow block N-4 with block 
N-3^', as well as block N-3. The attempt to replace transaction X with X^' will 
only succeed if the branch of the chain that includes block N-3^' becomes the 
longest one. Until this is true, other nodes will disregard block N-3^'. However, if 
the malicious node has computing power sufficient to append enough blocks to 
the branch of the chain that includes N-3^', it will eventually become longer than 
the one that includes block N-3. At that time, the implicit consensus mechanism 
will make the branch of the chain that includes block N-3^' the valid one, leaving 
the original branch to be disregarded and the original transaction, X, to be 
forgotten. Figure 3 depicts this situation. 
The specific mechanism used to determine which node can append a block to the 
chain depends on the implementation of the blockchain. Public blockchains 
dealing with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin incentivize nodes to participate by 
rewarding nodes with cryptocurrency if they add a new block. In this approach, 
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the right to add a block is earned by solving a computational puzzle (called ‘proof 
of work’). This places nodes in competition to solve the puzzle first. Nodes with 
more computing power do better at solving puzzles and, therefore, get to add 
more blocks and earn more cryptocurrency. Rewarding nodes for adding blocks is 
an incentive to recruit nodes, who might not otherwise dedicate their computing 
power to the blockchain. However, this mechanism also allows sufficiently 
powerful nodes to make arbitrary changes to the blockchain.  
 
 
Figure 3. A retrospective fork in a blockchain to change a transaction in block N-3 
Blockchains that rely exclusively on a node’s computing power to earn the right 
to append blocks lack controls to ensure that nodes do not collude or to prevent 
the centralization of computing power. The only control possible is to monitor the 
computer power that nodes display (Piscini et al., 2017) and expect any overly 
powerful node to reduce its computing power to a level below what is needed to 
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take arbitrary actions. As an example of this, in 2014, a pool of miners (Ghash.io) 
acquired more than 50% of the computing power in the Bitcoin network; they 
voluntarily reduced their power and pledged not to exceed 40% of the power of 
the network in future (Frankenfield, 2019). 
Based on the risk of centralization of power in blockchains relying exclusively on 
computing power to earn the right to append a block, we propose cybersecurity 
control 3: the computing power of nodes should be monitored constantly to warn 
when centralization is becoming a threat. 
Not all blockchains use the proof of work mechanism to decide which node has 
the right to append a block to the chain. In another mechanism, named proof of 
stake, the node who wins the competition to append a block has a stake on the 
validity of the block. If other nodes find that the block is invalid, the node 
proposing the new invalid block loses its stake, and the right to be part of the 
consensus network. Proof of stake segregates duties because the node appending a 
block is different from the nodes validating the block.  
Other mechanisms eliminate competition and computing power all together, and 
nodes earn the right to add a block by taking turns (a round-robin approach) or by 
having the shortest random CPU-generated waiting time (proof of elapsed time). 
These mechanisms are mostly used in private blockchains because the incentive to 
participate in the blockchain is to increase the reliability of the information, rather 
than increasing their wealth.  
Based on the risk of nodes manipulating the blockchain in different mechanisms, 
we propose cybersecurity control 4: the mechanism used to earn the right to 
append a block to the chain should reduce the possibility of a node altering the 
blockchain. 
4.4. Attacks breaking cryptographic algorithms 
Cryptographic algorithms are used in blockchains as a built-in mechanism to 
validate transactions (as in the digital signatures of the wallets) and to validate 
blocks (as in the unique identifiers created for each block). Given enough time, 
any encrypted code can be broken using a trial-and-error approach. The possibility 
of breaking an encrypted code would give the ability to modify transactions and 
blocks, threatening the core of immutability of records. According to Bennett et 
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al. (1997), cryptosystems with keys of 112 bits may be breakable in 30 or 40 years 
(using the typical computing power of computers today). 
As computing power increases, the time to break an encrypted code decreases. 
According to Chen et al. (2016), it is likely that by 2030 a quantum computer will 
be capable of breaking a 2000-bit RSA key in a matter of hours. The risk of 
increasing computing power led the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology to announce in 2016 a plan to move to post-quantum cryptography 
(also called quantum-resistant cryptography) to develop cryptographic systems 
that will be secure from both quantum and classical computers. The need to 
evolve blockchains towards quantum cryptographic algorithms to secure 
cryptocurrencies has already been pointed out (Gao et al., 2018).  
Stronger cryptographic algorithms obviously represent stronger controls. 
Although quantum cryptography is not available yet, algorithms, such as SHA-
368—that are stronger than those currently used, such as SHA256 and the 
RIPEMD—are currently available. However, migrating to stronger cryptographic 
algorithms is a challenge for blockchains in which the decisions to make changes 
to the blockchain are fully decentralized, like in Bitcoin. Blockchains in which the 
decisions to improve the blockchain are centralized (private blockchains and 
public blockchains like Ethereum) can plan and enforce the migration to stronger 
cryptographic algorithms. 
We discuss the migration of protocols in general in a later section because the 
possibility of unexpected problems arising during migration increases the 
vulnerability of a system during the process. In terms of migration plans related to 
cryptographic algorithms, the plan should evaluate the impact of the migration on 
all the elements using cryptography. The plan should indicate, for instance, how 
the private and public keys used for wallets will be updated, and how the nodes 
will be updated. In addition, the plan should evaluate whether the transition to 
stronger cryptographic algorithms will have an impact on transaction malleability 
or other known vulnerabilities.  
Based on the increased risk during the migration of cryptographic algorithms, we 
propose cybersecurity control 5: a migration plan should be developed for 
transitioning to stronger cryptographic algorithms. 
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4.5. Theft of private keys 
Private keys (one of the elements of digital signatures) are the basic authorization 
control that blockchains employ; anyone who knows the private key can conduct 
transactions with the wallet associated with it. As such, controls should be 
implemented to prevent unauthorized access to private keys. In public 
blockchains, the ability to conduct transactions using a single private key, without 
authenticating the identity of the owner of the wallet, ensures the anonymity of 
users. However, when private keys are lost, the tokens in the wallet associated 
with the private key are permanently lost, too. Owners of cybercurrency in public 
blockchains are aware of the irretrievability of lost private keys and are willing to 
accept the risks of having a single private key for transaction authorization.  
There are several alternatives to using a single private key in a single device. One 
alternative is to store the private key in multiple devices, even in cold storage (a 
device not connected to the internet). This alternative protects the owner of the 
wallet from the failure or loss of the private key when the key is stored in a single 
device; it increases, however, the number of devices from which the private key 
can be stolen. 
A second alternative is to store the private key in the cloud with a web exchange, 
such as Bitfinex. This alternative shifts the responsibility of establishing access 
controls to protect the private key from the owner of the wallet to the web 
provider. The web exchange can implement common access controls, such as 
passwords, device or location recognition, or two-factor authentication. With this 
alternative, the legitimacy and cybersecurity of the web provider is critical. 
Illegitimate web exchanges can lure customers and then disappear with their 
private keys, stealing the tokens of all their customers—a form of corporate 
phishing attack.  
Web exchanges should be required to provide evidence of the controls 
implemented to protect the private keys of the customers, including insurance to 
reimburse tokens lost from stolen private keys protected by the exchange. Web 
exchanges should also develop a transition plan in case the web exchange goes 
out of business. This evidence can be provided with a Systems and Organization 
Control 2 type 2 report, supplemented with insurance and transition plans.  
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Based on risks posed by the use of web exchanges, we propose cybersecurity 
control 6: web exchanges should provide evidence of controls, including 
insurance and transition plans. 
Rather than relying on a single private key to authorize transactions, blockchains 
can also implement a mechanism, called multisig, to require multiple private keys 
(typically two) to authorize a transaction. Multisig is a mechanism similar to those 
commonly used in accounting systems that require multiple employees to 
authorize a transaction. Checking accounts, for instance, can be set to require two 
signatures to authorize checks with amounts above a designated threshold. In a 
similar fashion, blockchain multisig issues multiple private keys for a single 
wallet (three private keys for instance) requiring more than one private key to 
authorize a transaction (two private keys for instance). Private keys are usually 
stored in different locations; if a private key is lost, there would still be two 
private keys available to authorize the transaction. This control would also prevent 
the use of a stolen private key to conduct a transaction because the attacker would 
require a second private key. Multisig requires access controls in all points where 
private keys are stored. 
Multisig is stronger when the access controls of web exchanges can be 
supplemented with algorithms to identify unusual transactions, similar to 
algorithms used by credit card institutions to identify possible fraudulent 
transactions. For instance, a wallet with three private keys can assign two of the 
private keys to the wallet owner and the third private key to the web exchange. A 
transaction can be authorized with one of the private keys of the wallet owner and 
the private key of the web exchange. The algorithm would flag suspicious 
transactions that would need to be confirmed with the wallet owner before 
providing the necessary second private key to authorize the transaction. Because 
the owner has two private keys, the owner can always bypass the exchange and 
authorize the transactions with the two private keys.  
Based on risks of using a single private key, we propose cybersecurity control 7: 
the authorization of critical transactions should require multiple private keys. 
4.6. Usurped public keys 
Public keys (one of the elements of digital signatures) are used in blockchains as 
unique identifiers of wallets; public keys are the destination address in a 
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transaction. Although public keys are known by the general public, wallets and 
web exchanges should implement controls to prevent unauthorized access to 
public keys. Attackers may change references to the victim’s public key (perhaps 
in a web page) to the attacker’s public key, diverting the tokens sent to the 
legitimate address to the attacker’s address. 
There is a malware named BitcoinStealer—a variation of the ransomware 
“Jigsaw”—that substitutes the public key of the wallet attacked with the attacker’s 
public key (Palmer, 2018). The attacker’s address has the same characters at the 
beginning and end of the legitimate address, making it difficult for the wallet 
owner to identify the change without closer examination (Palmer, 2018). It is 
expected that malware attacks to substitute public keys will become more popular 
because the attack is more reliable, non-intrusive, and profitable than other attacks 
(Chong, 2018). 
Attacks to public keys have also been reported in web exchanges in which 
attackers gain access to the website and change the public key displayed on the 
site. Our review of the literature identified multiple successful attacks in which 
the change of the public key went unnoticed for some time, in one case, 
amounting to $10 million diverted (Bryk, 2018; De, 2017). Preventing these 
attacks requires the implementation of the usual controls to prevent ransomware 
and unauthorized access controls. 
In addition to these controls, a duplicate of the public key could be stored 
separately, so a program can continuously and automatically compare the public 
key in the wallet or the website to the public key stored somewhere else. The 
program would note the change of the public key almost immediately, enabling 
the correction of the public key promptly to prevent losses.  
Based on the possibility of illegitimate changes to public keys, we propose 
cybersecurity control 8: the accuracy of public keys should be continuously and 
automatically tested. 
4.7. Transaction malleability attacks 
A transaction malleability attack is the creation of a modified copy of a 
transaction that enables the attacker to receive tokens from a modified transaction 
and, at the same time, claim that no tokens were received, deceiving the sender 
into issuing a new transaction to transfer more tokens. This cybersecurity threat is 
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possible because of the way in which transactions are identified and propagated 
among the nodes of a blockchain. Blockchains without appropriate cybersecurity 
controls (up-to-date protocols for validating transactions) and wallets without 
proper controls, can lead senders to be unaware of modified transactions, and fall 
into the deception of issuing new transactions. Although transaction malleability 
could affect different implementations of blockchains, the vulnerabilities of 
Bitcoin’s blockchain have been widely analysed (Andrychowicz et al., 2015). We 
anchor our discussion on transaction malleability on Bitcoin’s blockchain. 
Blockchains identify transactions by assigning a unique identifier (Tx_ID) to each 
transaction. The unique identifier is created based on the content of the transaction 
(sender, receiver, amount, and other information). If the transaction data is 
modified, the resulting unique identifier is different. A malicious receiver can 
modify some information of the transaction data, changing the syntax of the 
transaction—and the Tx_ID as a result—without changing the semantics; that is, 
the tokens are still transferred from the sender to the receiver. The sequence of a 
malleability attack is: 1) the sender creates a transaction to transfer tokens to a 
receiver (who is the attacker). The wallet computes the corresponding Tx_ID and 
broadcasts the transaction to other nodes in the blockchain. This transaction will 
be ready to be validated and inputted into a new block. 2) The attacker receives 
the transaction, modifies it and broadcasts the modified transaction with its new 
identifier Tx_ID’, hoping that the modified transaction will be validated and 
inputted into a block before the original transaction. If the modified transaction is 
the one validated and inputted into a block, the tokens associated with the 
transaction will be transferred to the attacker and the validation of the original 
transaction will fail, allowing the attacker to claim that the tokens were not 
received. The sender will not find the transaction with the identifier Tx_ID in the 
blockchain and would be deceived into issuing a new transaction to transfer 
tokens. 
It seems counterintuitive that the original transaction will fail to be validated when 
the sender might have tokens in the wallet. For instance, the sender owns 100 
tokens and issues a transaction to transfer 20 tokens; apparently, the original and 
the modified transaction should be able to cash 20 tokens each, leaving 60 tokens 
in the wallet. This operation would be similar to creating a falsified copy of a 
check and cashing the check twice (the original and the falsified copy). However, 
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tokens in blockchains are different from money because—as mentioned in the 
section introducing blockchain—tokens are unique, and they are locked and 
unlocked with the digital signature of the owner. In a transaction malleability 
attack, the receiver will get the tokens from the modified transaction and lock 
them, making the receiver the new owner. So, when nodes try to validate the 
original transaction, the digital signature of the sender will fail to unlock the 
tokens, as now the tokens are locked by the attacker. 
The locking and unlocking of tokens are coded in small scripts that may be part of 
the transaction data, and if so, the small script would be included to compute the 
unique identifier of the transaction. Wuille (2019) identified nine different ways in 
which transactions can be modified through a transaction malleability attack in 
Bitcoin. One way in which an attacker can modify a transaction is by slightly 
changing the script that locks and unlocks tokens with innocuous instructions, in 
such a way that the changes would not affect the programming logic nor the 
execution of the script (Rajput et al., 2018), but would modify the unique 
identifier of the transaction if the script is part of the transaction data used to 
compute the unique identifier. 
Transaction malleability attacks of this type can be prevented by excluding the 
small script that locks and unlocks the tokens in the computation of the unique 
identifier, so if an attacker modifies the script, the identifier of the transaction 
would remain the same. In 2017, the blockchain used in Bitcoin was updated with 
a protocol called SegWit (Segregated Witness) that prevents a transaction 
malleability attack altering the small script by excluding the data from the digital 
signatures in the small script in the calculation of the unique identifier of the 
transaction. Although different forms of transaction malleability attacks have been 
identified, potential new ways of malleability attacks should be investigated.  
Based on the risks posed by transaction malleability attacks, we propose 
cybersecurity control 9: protocols to identify and prevent known malleability 
attacks should be deployed. 
4.8. Flawed or malicious smart contracts 
A smart contract is a program stored in a blockchain that executes automatically 
when the conditions specified (and programmed) in the contract are fulfilled. 
They are called smart contracts because the transaction remains latent (inactive) 
waiting for the conditions to be fulfilled; the fulfillment of the conditions trigger 
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the transaction coded in the program to be inexorably completed. For instance, a 
contract may indicate that a given number of tokens (cryptocurrency or any other 
token managed by the blockchain) are to be transferred from the wallet of 
company A to the wallet of company B when company B delivers some specified 
set of goods to company A. The smart contract includes: a) the latent transaction 
(tokens to be transferred), and b) the condition that needs to be fulfilled to trigger 
the execution of the transaction (delivery of the goods). Although smart contracts 
were originally proposed to execute transactions, smart contracts could also be 
used to support audits (Rozario and Vasarhelyi, 2018) 
The automatic execution of a program when a set of conditions are fulfilled is not 
a new concept in information systems. Accounting information systems, for 
instance, can be programmed to send a warning message when the funds in a 
checking account are low. Also, suspicious credit card transactions automatically 
trigger requests for credit card holders to verify the transaction. What makes smart 
contracts unique is that, once they are inserted in a blockchain, the contract cannot 
be disabled or modified (because of the immutability of the data stored in the 
blockchain), ensuring that the transaction will be executed as originally agreed. 
The inexorability of the execution of a smart contract is not only its greatest 
strength, but it is simultaneously its greatest weakness; smart contracts can be 
incorrect or hide malicious code. As a result, a cybersecurity control should 
identify threats embedded—on purpose or inadvertently—in smart contracts 
before they are inserted in a blockchain (Dai and Vasarhelyi, 2017). A nascent 
industry satisfies this need by offering auditing of smart contract code where one 
or more auditors evaluate the code for vulnerabilities before its insertion into a 
blockchain. BountyOne, for instance, follows a decentralized audit model with 
three steps to audit smart contracts (BountyOne, 2019). In the first step, a small 
number of auditors work independently to review the smart contract and write an 
audit report. In the second step, senior auditors review and rank the audit reports. 
In the third step, the highest-ranking audit report is open to all the auditors 
affiliated with BountyOne for audit.  
Smart contracts should not only be audited before being inserted to a blockchain, 
but the audit should be conducted by an independent entity—someone not 
involved in the transaction and connected with the nodes in the blockchain. 
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Independence is necessary to avoid potential conflicts of interest that can reduce 
evaluation objectivity.  
Based on the risks posed by flawed or harmful smart contracts, we propose 
cybersecurity control 10: smart contracts should be audited by an independent 
entity before being inserted into a blockchain. 
4.9. Compromised oracles and arbitrators 
Smart contracts are usually tied to events in the real world: the delivery of 
physical goods, the transfer of property, the delivery of a digital key to activate 
the software, or any other transaction. As a result, an important component in 
smart contracts is the entity—one outside the blockchain—who verifies the event 
has happened. These external entities, known as oracles, communicate to the 
blockchain when an event in the world has happened, activating the trigger in the 
smart contract that executes the transaction. 
Oracles and arbitrators are components of the blockchain ecosystem; the 
information they provide impacts the reliability of the information in a 
blockchain. Oracles are intermediaries between blockchains and events in the 
world (as opposed to digital events). Arbitrators are, as the name implies, referees 
in a disputed transaction. Oracles and arbitrators should be protected against 
systems threats (unauthorized access, denial of service attacks, ransomware, and 
others) to preserve the integrity of the information they provide. In addition, they 
should be independent from the rest of the components of the blockchain 
ecosystem to preserve their objectivity in performing their duties. Oracles and 
arbitrators should also implement controls to authorize and verify the information 
before it is sent to the blockchain. 
Compromised oracles might send information about events that have not 
happened, as if they had happened (for instance, indicating that goods have been 
delivered, when in fact they have not been delivered).  Conversely, an oracle 
might not send information about an event that has in fact happened. 
Compromised arbitrators might send information favoring the incorrect party in 
the dispute, or might refuse at all to resolve a dispute, stalling the transaction 
indefinitely. Oracles and arbitrators should implement segregation of duties, in 
which the entity (person/department/system) recording the event should be 
different from the entity (person/department/system) verifying the event. Only 
Canelón, Huerta, Incera and Ryan                                                      Blockchain cybersecurity framework…125 
transactions that have been independently verified should be sent to the 
blockchain.  
Based on the risk of compromised oracles and arbitrators, we propose 
cybersecurity control 11: oracles and arbitrators should implement independent 
verification controls to ensure the reliability of the information sent to a 
blockchain. 
Similar to other components of the blockchain ecosystem, oracles and arbitrators 
should be independent from parties of the transaction, nodes, and smart contract 
auditors. Segregation of duties suggests that oracles, as providers of information, 
should not be responsible for recording transactions, which is the responsibility of 
the nodes, or for auditing smart contracts, which is the responsibility of smart 
contract auditors. Segregation of duties will also prevent, for instance, an oracle 
associated with company B fraudulently indicating that company B delivered the 
goods to company A when, in fact, the goods have not been delivered. Moreover, 
the independence of oracles and arbitrators should be evaluated beyond the legal 
structure of the companies, as oracles, arbitrators, nodes, or transaction parties can 
collude without being legally associated. In addition, independence should be 
monitored constantly, as collusion might start at any time.  
Based on segregation of duties for oracles and arbitrators, we propose 
cybersecurity control 12: oracles should be independent from other components of 
the blockchain ecosystem (transaction parties, nodes, and smart contract 
auditors). 
4.10. Disorderly migration of protocols 
Migrating protocols, as the name implies, refers to deprecating the use of one or 
more protocols in the blockchain and substituting them with new protocols. As 
any ecosystem, the blockchain ecosystem needs all of its components to agree on 
the protocols to be used. As new vulnerabilities arise or more efficient protocols 
are developed, the ecosystem should evolve. The way in which protocols are 
migrated depends on the blockchain implementation. 
The blockchain used in Bitcoin, for instance, has a mechanism known as Bitcoin 
improvement proposal. In this mechanism, an upgrade is proposed, but it will be 
deployed only if the majority of the nodes’ computing power accepts it. This 
mechanism favors complete decentralization, but risks the rejection of protocols 
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needed to improve the performance or attenuate the vulnerability of the 
blockchain. For instance, the SegWit protocol to prevent transaction protocol has 
not been fully deployed by all nodes in the Bitcoin blockchain (Kim, 2019). 
In other public blockchains, like Ethereum, there is a group of experts in charge of 
its evolution. Aspiring members of the Ethereum ecosystem must agree, before 
joining the ecosystem, that they will adopt the protocols as determined by the 
group of experts. Similarly, private blockchains determine the required upgrades 
promoting a smoother transition than fully decentralized blockchains. The degree 
to which upgrades are centralized to make them mandatory influences the risks of 
having multiple protocols coexisting or failing to adopt necessary updates.  
Based on the risks of a disorderly migration of protocols, we propose 
cybersecurity control 13: the migration of protocols should be enforced. 
Despite having a tighter influence on the migration of protocols, any migration 
can lead to unexpected consequences. As such, as other ecosystems, blockchains 
should implement controls for evaluating the potential consequences of the 
migration and plan for rollbacks in case of unexpected consequences.  
Based on the risks of unexpected consequences in the migration of protocols, we 
propose cybersecurity control 14: a complete migration plan should be developed 
to migrate protocols. 
5. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR CYBERSECURITY CONTROLS 
FOR BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEMS 
Internal controls are the policies and procedures developed to ensure reliability of 
information, efficiency of operations, and compliance with regulations. Our 
control framework focuses on cybersecurity controls to ensure the reliability of 
the information in a blockchain. This framework can inform a comprehensive 
internal control framework that addresses the efficiency of operations, and 
compliance with regulations. For instance, blockchains storing data from 
Europeans must comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). A 
comprehensive control framework for blockchain should include compliance with 
GDPR, among other laws. The scope of our framework is limited to the 
cybersecurity controls to reasonably ensure the reliability of the information 
stored in a blockchain. 
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Our framework identifies the different components of a blockchain ecosystem and 
their associated risks and controls. Table 3 lists the different components of a 
blockchain ecosystems and the risks identified. This table also identifies whether 
the risk is exclusive of blockchain ecosystems or the risk is applicable to any other 
system. Although the risks are identified with a particular component, a 
cybersecurity breach on any component will impact the reliability of the 
information in the blockchain.  
Component Risk Exclusive to 
blockchain 
Nodes Centralization of computing power Y 
Breakable cryptographic algorithms N 
Disorderly migration of protocols N 
Unexpected consequences in migration protocols N 
Wallets Ransomware N 
Corporate phishing through web exchanges N 
Loss or theft of private key N 
Usurped public key N 
Transaction malleability Y 
Oracles and 
arbitrators 
Distributed denial of service attack N 
Ransomware N 
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Compromised oracles or arbitrators N 
Collusion N 
Web exchanges Ransomware N 
Loss or theft of private key N 
Usurped public keys N 
Smart contract Flawed or malicious code Y 
Table 3. Blockchain ecosystem components and identified risks 
As table 4 shows, we identified thirteen risks, most of them applicable to any 
other information system. Blockchain components are not exempt from 
ransomware attacks, distributed denial of service, or other attacks affecting other 
systems. Also, as is true of other systems using digital signatures, there are risks 
associated with public and private keys. However, we identified three risks 
exclusive to the blockchain ecosystem: centralization of computing power, 
transaction malleability attacks, and flawed or malicious code in smart contracts. 
In addition to identifying risks, our framework proposes controls to mitigate risks. 
Although some of these controls are commonly used in other information systems, 
(e.g., segregation of duties), our framework customizes the controls as they apply 
to the different components of the blockchain ecosystem. Our framework also 
includes controls proposed in the literature (e.g., the use of multiple private keys 
to authorize transactions) and proposed new controls (e.g., testing the accuracy of 
public key). Table 4 summarizes the proposed control related to the risks they are 
meant to mitigate.  
Risk Controls 
Distributed denial of Reduce the surface area of potential attacks and establish baselines 
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service attack on normal traffic. 





Monitor the centralization of computing power. 
Implement protocols to earn the right to append a block that reduce 
the possibility of a node altering the blockchain. 
Breakable cryptographic 
algorithms 
Developed a plan for transitioning to stronger cryptographic 
algorithms. 
Corporate phishing 
through web exchanges 
Provide evidence of controls, including insurance and transition 
plans. 
Loss or theft of private 
key 
Require multiple private keys to authorize critical transactions. 
Usurped private key Test the accuracy of public keys continuously and automatically. 
Transaction malleability 
 
Deploy protocols that identify and prevent known malleability 
attacks. 
Flawed or malicious 
code 
Conduct an independent audit of the smart contract code. 
Compromised oracles or 
arbitrators 
Implement independent verification for information sent to a 
blockchain. 
Collusion of oracles or 
arbitrators 
Monitor the independence of oracles and arbitrators from other 
components of the blockchain ecosystem. 
Disorderly migration of Enforce migration of protocols 





Develop a complete migration plan 
Table 4. Proposed cybersecurity controls to mitigate risks 
Our framework does not distinguish controls for public and private blockchains. 
The implementation of controls should consider that the relative smaller number 
of nodes of private blockchains compared to public blockchains make the former 
more vulnerable to some risks; however, private blockchains have more flexibility 
to implement more stringent controls. For instance, enforcing the migration of 
protocols is only possible for private blockchains and for public blockchains with 
centralized decision making (such as Ethereum). 
6. DISCUSSION 
We developed a framework for cybersecurity controls for blockchain ecosystems 
drawing from the practitioner and academic literature. We identified thirteen risks, 
ten common to other information systems, and three exclusive to blockchain 
ecosystems (centralization of computing power, transaction malleability attacks, 
and flawed or malicious code in smart contracts). The proposed framework 
focuses on cybersecurity controls to protect the reliability of the information 
stored in the blockchain. However, as any other information system, blockchains 
face risks other than cyberattacks that should be addressed by a comprehensive 
internal control system. The cybersecurity framework proposed in this paper can 
inform such a comprehensive framework. 
As is true of any control system, the implementation of controls for blockchains 
should evaluate the trade-off between security and performance. Controls are 
costly and slow down the speed at which transactions can be processed. For 
instance, requiring multiple private keys to authorize a transaction might delay 
transactions that should be recorded immediately. However, the wait might be 
justified considering the amount of the transaction. 
Because control frameworks are essentially broad, organizations can use them as 
guides to create specific control structures tailored to their situations. We envision 
others using the framework we have developed as a model for policies and 
Canelón, Huerta, Incera and Ryan                                                      Blockchain cybersecurity framework…131 
practices (operational and audit) to ensure sound cybersecurity activities across a 
variety of settings. In developing specific policies and practices, organizations 
may engage in design research projects (Hevner et al., 2004) that would take our 
framework as one input.  One view on design research (Walls et al., 1992) 
recommends that designers begin with one or more kernel theories to provide 
basic knowledge concerning the phenomena of interest. According to Gregor and 
Jones (2004), such theories can be frameworks. They maintain “the term theory 
encompasses what might be termed elsewhere conjectures, models, frameworks, 
or bodies of knowledge” (2004, p. 314).  The knowledge that serves as theories in 
support of design research can sprout from many varied sources and may even be 
embodied in existing artifacts (Gregor and Jones, 2004). We maintain that the 
framework presented here can serve as a kernel theory to guide future design 
research under a wide range of conditions. 
The framework proposed provides guidance to develop standards for blockchain 
controls and audit. It could be useful to regulators as they seek to define rules 
under which blockchain ecosystems should operate. The framework can be also 
be useful to foster a research agenda for evaluating the efficiency of the controls, 
for instance, or for developing alternative controls to mitigate the risks identified.  
A limitation of the framework is that some controls are broadly stated (i.e. 
conduct an independent audit of the smart contract code). To provide actionable 
guidance, these controls should be further developed in detail. Another limitation 
is the currency of the framework. The framework identified risks based on the 
technology used in blockchain implementations today. As with any other 
information system, the framework must be updated as blockchains evolve. 
Similarly, this framework, as any other internal control framework, can be 
thwarted; the most stringent controls can be circumvented with collusion.  
Although this framework focused on control principles rather than the technology 
behind blockchains, the close intertwining of technology and controls in 
blockchains highlights the need for accountants to understand, at least at the 
conceptual level, the technology that enables blockchains to ensure the 
immutability of records. This framework could be used to guide updates to the 
accounting curriculum to ensure accountants have the necessary knowledge to 
audit cybersecurity controls in blockchains. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we conducted an exhaustive review of practitioner and academic 
literatures concerning the demonstrated and potential weaknesses of the 
blockchain ecosystem. We reviewed published reports concerning actual attacks 
on blockchain-based systems, potential weaknesses in blockchain 
implementations, and suggestions for preventing/reducing such 
attacks/weaknesses.  
Having carried out this review, we constructed a control framework organized in 
terms of risks and controls.  The framework primarily concerns cybersecurity 
controls that help to reasonably ensure the reliability of the information in a 
blockchain. It identifies thirteen risks for systems in the blockchain ecosystem, 
three of which apply to blockchain implementations only. The blockchain-only 
risks include: centralization of computing power, transaction malleability, and 
flawed or malicious smart contracts. The framework associates controls with each 
risk. Some of these controls had been proposed in the existing literature; some we 
have defined. We adapted existing controls (ones suitable for non-blockchain 
systems) for use in the blockchain ecosystem. 
The framework has both practical and academic value. It can aid instructors in 
accounting and information systems in choosing concepts for their curricula.  It 
can aid cybersecurity auditors in maintaining a comprehensive view of what can 
go wrong with blockchain ecosystems. It can serve researchers in accounting and 
information systems as one input, a form of kernel theory, for design research 
projects aimed at creating improved cybersecurity control artifacts. 
8. REFERENCES 
ANDRYCHOWICZ, M.; DZIEMBOWSKI, S.; MALINOWSKI, D.; 
MAZUREK, Ł. (2015): “On the Malleability of Bitcoin Transactions”, In 
Brenner, M., Christin, N., Johnson, B., Rohloff, K. (Eds.). Financial Cryptography 
and Data Security. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. Vol. 8976: 1-18. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48051-9_1  
ANTONOPOULOS, A. (2017): “Mastering Bitcoin: Programming the Open 
Blockchain”, 2nd ed. O’Reilly Media.  
AWS. (2019): “What is a DDoS Attack?”. https://aws.amazon.com/shield/ddos-
attack-protection/ 
Canelón, Huerta, Incera and Ryan                                                      Blockchain cybersecurity framework…133 
BENNETT, C.; BERSTEIN, E.; BRASSAD, G.; VAZIRANI, U. (1997): 
“Strengths and Weaknesses of Quantum Computing”, SIAM Journal of 
Computing, Vol. 26, No. 5: 1510-1523. https://doi.org/10.1137/s00975397963 
00933  
BOUNTYONE, (2019): “Decentralized Smart Contract Audits”. 
https://bountyone.io/auditsLanding 
BRIDGES, L. (2008): “The Changing Face of Malware”, Network Security, No. 
1: 17–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1353-4858(08)70010-2  
BRYK, A. (2018): “Blockchain Attack Vectors: Vulnerabilities of the Most 
Secure Technology”. https://www.apriorit.com/dev-blog/578-blockchain-attack-
vectors 
CERT-EU. (2017): “Wannacry Ransomware Campaign Exploiting SMB 
Vulnerability”. https://cert.europa.eu/static/SecurityAdvisories/2017/CERT-EU-
SA2017-012.pdf. 
CHEN, L.; JORDAN, S.; LIU. Y., PERALTA; R., PERLNER, R.; and SMITH-
TONE, D. (2016): “Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography”. https://doi.org/ 
10.6028/nist.ir.8105  
CHONG, N. (2018): “The Jigsaw Ransomware Has Been Revived to Steal 
Bitcoin from Unsuspecting Users”. https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/07/20/the-
jigsaw-ransomware-has-been-revived-to-steal-bitcoin-from-unsuspecting-users/ 
CONTI, M.; GANGWAK, G.; RUJ, S. (2018): “On the Economic Significance of 
Ransomware Campaigns: A Bitcoin Transaction Perspective.” Computers & 
Security, Vol. 79: 162-189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2018.08.008  
DAI, J.; VASARHELYI, M. A. (2017): “Toward Blockchain-based Accounting 
and Assurance”, Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 31, No. 3: 5-21. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/isys-51804  
DE, N. (2017): “Hacks, Scams and Attacks: Blockchain’s 2017 Disasters”. 
https://www.coindesk.com/hacks-scams-attacks-blockchains-biggest-2017-
disasters  
FRANKENFIELD, J. (2019): “51% Attack”. https://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/1/51-attack.asp 
134   The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research                                                               Vol. 19 
GAO Y.; CHEN, X.; CHEN, Y.; SUN, Y.; NIU, X.; YANG, Y. (2018): “A 
Secure Cryptocurrency Scheme Based on Post-quantum Blockchain.” IEEE 
Access, Vol. 6: 27205–27213. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2018.2827203  
GREEVINK, B. (2018): “What Is a DDoS Attack and What Are the 
Consequences?”. https://www.trimm.nl/en/blogs/wat-is-een-ddos-aanval-en-wat-
zijn-de-risicos 
GREGOR, S.; HEVNER, A. (2013): “Positioning and Presenting Design Science 
Research for Maximum Impact,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3: 337-355. 
https://doi.org/10.25300/misq/2013/37.2.01  
GREGOR, S.; JONES, D (2004): “The Formulation of Design Theories for 
Information Systems,” in Linger, H. et al. (Eds.) Constructing the Infrastructure 
for the Knowledge Economy: Methods and Tools, Theory and Practice, New 
York: Kluwer Academic, 83-93. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4852-9_4  
HEVNER, A.; MARCH, S.; JINSOO, P.; RAM, S. (2004): “Design Science in 
Information Systems Research”, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1: 75-105. 
https:/doi.org/10.2307/25148625 
ISACA (2019): “Blockchain Preparation Audit Program”, ISACA, 
https://next.isaca.org/bookstore/audit-control-and-security-essentials/wapbap  
KHATRI, Y. (2019): “Singapore-Based Crypto Exchange DragonEx Has Been 
Hacked”. https://www.coindesk.com/louis-vuitton-owner-lvmh-is-launching-a-
blockchain-to-track-luxury-goods 
KIM, C. (2019): “One Year Later, What’s Holding Back SegWit Adoption on 
Bitcoin?”. https://www.coindesk.com/one-year-later-whats-holding-back-segwit-
adoption-on-bitcoin  
KOLODENKER, E.; KOCH, W.; STRINGHINI, G.; EGELE, M. (2017): 
“PayBreak: Defense Against Cryptographic Ransomware”, In Proceedings of the 
2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Abu 
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, April 06-06, 599-611. https://doi.org/10.1145 
/3052973.3053035 
KSHETRI, N.; VOAS. J. (2017): “Do Crypto-Currencies Fuel Ransomware?”, IT 
Security, Vol. 19, No. 5: 11-15. https://doi.org/10.1109/mitp.2017.3680961  
KUCHLER, H. (2016): “Cyber attacks Raise Questions about Blockchain 
Security”. https://www.ft.com/content/05b5efa4-7382-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a 
Canelón, Huerta, Incera and Ryan                                                      Blockchain cybersecurity framework…135 
KUMAR, S.; KUMAR M. (2013): “Cryptoviral Extortion: A Virus Based 
Approach.” International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology, Vol. 4, 
No. 5: 1149-1153. http://www.ijcttjournal.org/Volume4/issue-5/IJCTT-
V4I5P38.pdf 
LI, X.; JIANG, P.; CHEN, T.; LUO, X.; WEN, Q. (2017): “A Survey on the 
Security of Blockchain Systems”, Future Generation Computer Systems 
(forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2017.08.020  
LIELACHER, A. (2018): “More 51% blockchain attacks expected”. 
https://bravenewcoin.com/insights/more-51-blockchain-attacks-expected  
LUO, X.; LIAO, Q. (2007): “Awareness Education as the Key to Ransomware 
Prevention”, Information Systems & Security, Vol. 16, No. 4: 195–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10658980701576412  
LUO, X.; LIAO, Q. (2009): “Ransomware: A New Cyber Hijacking Threat to 
Enterprises.” In Jatinder N. D. Gupta and Sushil Sharma (Eds.). Handbook of 
Research on Information Security and Assurance,1-6. https://doi.org/10 
.4018/9781599048550.ch001 
MOHURLE, S.; PATIL, M. (2017): “A Brief Study of Wannacry Threat: 
Ransomware Attack 2017”, International Journal of Advanced Research in 
Computer Science, Vol. 8, No. 5: 1938-1940. https://doi.org/10.26483/ 
ijarcs.v8i5.4021 
MUSTACA, S. (2014): “Are Your IT Professionals Prepared for the Challenges 
to Come?”, Computer Fraud & Security, Vol. 3: 18–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s1361-3723(14)70472-5  
ORCUTT, M. (2019): “Once Hailed as Unhackable, Blockchains Are Now 
Getting Hacked”. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612974/once-hailed-as-
unhackable-blockchains-are-now-getting-hacked/ 
PALISSE, A.; LE BOUDER, H.; LANET, JL.; LE GUERNIC, C.; LEGAY, A. 
(2017): “Ransomware and the Legacy Crypto API”, In Cuppens F., Cuppens N., 
Lanet JL., Legay A. (Eds.). Risks and Security of Internet and Systems, Vol. 
10158. 11-28. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54876-0_2  
PALMER, D. (2018): “This Old Ransomware Has Been Revamped as Bitcoin-
Stealing Malware”. https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-old-ransomware-has-been-
revamped-as-bitcoin-stealing-malware/ 
136   The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research                                                               Vol. 19 
PATHAK, P.; NANDED, Y. (2016): “A Dangerous Trend of Cybercrime: 
Ransomware Growing Challenge”, International Journal of Advanced Research in 
Computer Engineering & Technology, Vol. 5, No. 2: 371-373. 
http://ijarcet.org/wp-content/uploads/IJARCET-VOL-5-ISSUE-2-371-373.pdf 
PERKINS, C. (2019): “Blockchain Attacks and the Fight for Immutability”. 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/blockchain-attacks-and-the-fight-for-87600/  
PISCINI, E.; DALTON, D.; KEHOE, L. (2017): “Blockchain & Cyber Security”, 
Deloitte.https://www2.deloitte.com/tr/en/pages/technology-media-and-
telecommunications/articles/blockchain-and-cyber.html  
POPPER, N. (2015): “For Ransom, Bitcoin Replaces the Bag of Bills”, The New 
York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/business/dealbook/for-
ransom-bitcoin-replaces-the-bag-of-bills.html  
POWELL, B. (2018): “Not Only is a 51% Attack on Blockchain Possible, but It’s 
Coming: Is Bitcoin’s Blockchain as Secure as You Think?”. 
https://blocklr.com/news/51-attack-blockchain-more-likely-than-you-think/  
PRAKASH, K.; NAFIS, T.; SANKAR, S. (2017): “Preventive Measures and 
Incident Response for Locky Ransomware", International Journal of Advanced 
Research in Computer Science, Vol. 8, No. 5: 392-395. https://doi.org/ 
10.26483/ijarcs.v8i5.3311 
PRIYA, P. (2019): “Cryptopia Assures Users of Its Commitment to Reopening 
Exchange; Provides Update on Lost Funds”. https://ambcrypto.com/cryptopia-
assures-users-of-its-commitment-to-reopening-exchange-provides-update-on-lost-
funds/ 
RAHMANI, H.; SAHLI, N.; KAMMOUN, F. (2009): “Joint Entropy Analysis 
Model for DDoS Attack Detection in Information Assurance and Security”, Fifth 
International Conference on Information Assurance and Security, Vol 2: 267-271. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ias.2009.298  
RAJPUT, U.; ABBAS, F.; OH, H. (2018): “A Solution towards Eliminating 
Transaction Malleability in Bitcoin”, Journal of Information Processing Systems, 
Vol. 14, No. 4: 837-850. https://doi.org/10.3745/JIPS.03.0101 
RAPOPORT, M. (2018): “PwC Has an Answer for the Blockchain: Audit It”, 
Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/pwc-has-an-
answer-for-the-blockchain-audit-it-1521194401 
Canelón, Huerta, Incera and Ryan                                                      Blockchain cybersecurity framework…137 
RISBERG, J. (2018): “Yes, the Blockchain Can Be Hacked”. 
https://coincentral.com/blockchain-hacks/ 
ROZARIO, A.; VASARHELYI, M. (2018): “Auditing with Smart Contracts”, 
The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research, Vol. 18, No. 1: 1-27. 
https://doi.org/10.4192/1577-8517-v18_1  
SALEH, M.; MANAF, A. (2014): “Optimal Specifications for a Protective 
Framework Against HTTP-based DoS and DDoS Attacks,” in International 
Symposium on Biometrics and Security Technologies, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
August 26-27. https://doi.org/10.1109/isbast.2014.7013132  
SECURITY ALLIANCE (2017): “Know Your Ransomware: CTB-Locker”. 
https://www.secalliance.com/blog/ransomware-ctb-locker/ 
SGANDURRA, D.; MUÑOZ-GONZÁLEZ.; MOHSEN, R.; LUPU, E. C. (2016): 
“Automated Dynamic Analysis of Ransomware: Benefits, Limitations and Use for 
Detection”. https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.03020 
STROM, D. (2018): “Blockchain Exploits and Mining Attacks on the Rise as 
Cryptocurrency Prices Skyrocket”. https://securityintelligence.com/blockchain-
exploits-and-mining-attacks-on-the-rise-as-cryptocurrency-prices-skyrocket/ 
WALLS, J. G.; WIDMEYER, G. W.; El SAWY, O. A. (1992): “Building and 
Information Systems Design Theory for Vigilant EIS”, Information Systems 
Research, Vol. 3, No. 1: 36-59. https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.3.1.36  
WUILLE, P. (2019): “Dealing with Malleability”. http://github.com/bitcoin/bips/ 
blob/master/bip-0062.mediawiki 













138   The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research                                                               Vol. 19 
 
Appendix 1: Cybersecurity descriptions 
Concept Description 
Distributed denial of 
service attack 
Attack launched from multiple sources to make computers’ 
resources unavailable to users.  
Man-in-the-middle attack Attack where the attacker intercepts the traffic between two 
parties, and possibly altering the communication between them.  
Ransomware Malware (malicious software) designed to force users to pay a 
ransom in exchange of regaining access to their files and systems. 
Hash function Function that receive a message as an input and generates a 
unique output value derived from the content of the message. 
Hash functions should: 1. Make computationally infeasible to find 
an input based on the output, and 2. Make computationally 
infeasible to find any two different inputs with the same output 
(collision resistant). 
SHA A Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is a government standard hash 
function developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) used to provide integrity. 
Threat Circumstance that can result in an undesirable outcome. 
Malware Malicious Software.  
Cryptographic algorithm A computational procedure that takes inputs plus a cryptographic 
key, to produce an output. 
Digital signature The encrypted hash of a message, encrypted with the sender’s 
private key. 
Hash value The result of applying a hash function to information. 
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Private key A key associated with an entity that should not be disclosed. 
Public key A key associated with an entity that may be disclosed publicly. 
ECDSA Encryption algorithm approved by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology. 
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Appendix 2: Known blockchain security events 
Incident Date Blockchain Description Source 
1 2014 MtGox Transaction malleability 
 Went bankrupt 
Bryk, 2018 
2 2014 Bitcoin Centralization of computing power 
> 51% of total hash power attained by 
Ghash.io, one mining pool; not an 
attack -- Ghash.io voluntarily reduced 
their computing power to 40% or less 
Frankenfield, 
2019 
3 2014 Eligius 
mining pool 
Centralization of computing power 
Selfish mining attack on pool; loss of 
300 BTC 
Bryk, 2018 
4 2015 Bitcoin Distributed denial of service 
Attack by Coinwallet.eu to prove 
point of ease of attack 
Risberg, 2018 
5 2015 Bitcoin Distributed denial of service 
Flood attack of 80,000 small 
transactions, followed by millions of 
small transactions over the next year -
- intended to make a point in debate 
concerning transaction size 
Risberg, 2018 
6 2016 Bitfinex Not disclosed 
Cyber-attack -- loss of $65 million 
(Source reports attack, not its details) 
Kuchler, 2016 
7 2016 Ethereum 
DAO 
Distributed denial of service 
Loss of $50 million 
Kuchler, 2016; 
Strom, 2018 
8 2016 Ethereum Flawed or malicious code 
Attack via contract code -- loss of $80 
billion 
Bryk, 2018 
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Incident Date Blockchain Description Source 
9 2016 Krypton Centralization of computing power 
51% attack -- attack by ‘51 Crew’, 
ransom demand, which Krypton 





10 2016 Shift Centralization of computing power 
51% attack -- attack by ‘51 Crew’, 
ransom demand, which Shift refused 




11 2017 Ethereum 
DAO 
Transaction malleability 
Attacker exploited code to repeatedly 
refund ethers without updating 
balance -- loss of $50 million 
Risberg, 2018 
12 2017 Parity  Loss or theft of private key 
Bug in multi-signature wallets led to 
compromise of fundraisers for at least 
three ICO’s -- loss of 150,000 ethers, 
worth around $105 million  
De, 2017 
13 2017 Enigma Usurped private key 
After password attack on website, 
Ethereum address replaced on 
startup’s platform, redirecting 
$500,000 (eventually returned) 
Strom, 2018 
14 2017 Enigma  Corporate phishing 
Fake token presale, defrauded 
investors of at least 1,500 ethers: 
compromised website, mailing lists, 
administrator accounts -- funds not 
recovered, although control of 
business regained 
De, 2017 
15 2017 Tether Loss or theft of private key 
Tokens taken from company’s virtual 
treasury and sent to unknown Bitcoin 
De, 2017 
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Incident Date Blockchain Description Source 
address -- more than $30 million lost 
16 2017 Bitcoin Gold Corporate phishing 
Bogus service for cashing out tokens 
following blockchain split, seemed to 
be endorsed by Bitcoin Gold -- theft 
of more than $3 million in various 
cryptocurrencies from wallets 
De, 2017 
17 2017 Parity  Transaction malleability 
User found a bug that froze wallets 
containing more than $275 million in 
ether 
De, 2017 
18 2017 CoinDash  Usurped private key 
Attacker replaced the intended 
Ethereum  address for CoinDash’s 
initial coin offering with another one, 
causing funds to go to unknown party 
-- loss of $10 million 
Bryk, 2018;  
De, 2017 
19 2017 NiceHash Loss or theft of private key 
Either a mining malware attack (per 
Strom) or the compromising of an 
employee computer, giving access to 
the marketplace’s system (per De)-- 
loss of 4,700 BTC, worth between  
$64 million and $78 million 
De, 2017; 
Strom, 2018 
20 Np Bancor 
exchange 
Not disclosed 
Details not provided by source 
Bryk, 2018 
21 Np Litecoin Cash Not disclosed 




Loss or theft of private key 
Hack of key generation to access 
private keys -- loss of 250 BTC 
Bryk, 2018 
23 Np Hardware Loss or theft of private key Bryk, 2018 
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Incident Date Blockchain Description Source 
wallets 
Researchers able to get private keys, 
PIN’s, recovery seeds, passphrases 
24 Np Bitcoin Corporate phishing 
Chainalysis (a security analysis firm) 
created 250 fake bitcoin nodes to 
collect information about 
transactions; Bitcoin accused them of 
a Sybil attack; Chainalysis claimed 
that they had only done so for 
research purposes 
Zaghloul, 2018 
25 2018 Coincheck Loss or theft of private key 
NEM blockchain coins stolen from 
wallets 
Bryk, 2018 
26 2018 Monacoin Centralization of computing power 
51% attack (additional details not 




27 2018 Verge Centralization of computing power 
Suffered three 51% attacks during 
year:  
In the first, a miner used spoofed 
timestamps to mine blocks at a very 
fast rate (one block per second), 
taking a reported 250,000 XVG. 
In the second, using a similar 
approach, miners were able to mine at 
25 blocks per minute, taking $1.7 
million. 
A third attack occurred, but losses 




28 2018 ZenCash Centralization of computing power 
51% attack -- loss of $700,000 
through double spending 
Lielacher, 2018; 
Powell, 2018 
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Incident Date Blockchain Description Source 
29 2018 Electroneum Centralization of computing power 
51% attack (additional details not 
provided by source) 
Lielacher, 2018 
30 2018 Gambling site Flawed or malicious code 
Exploit of contract flaw -- loss of $4 
million 
Orcutt, 2019 
31 2018 Vertcoin Centralization of computing power 




32 2018 IOTA wallets Corporate phishing 
Loss of around $4 million 
Bryk, 2018 
33 2018 Bitcoin Gold Centralization of computing power 
51% attack -- loss of $18 million 





34 2019 Cryptopia Not disclosed 
Two security breaches (perhaps exit 
scam) -- Ethereum holders lost 100%, 
Litecoin holders lost 43%, BTC 
holders lost 14% 
Priya, 2019 
35 2019 Ethereum 
Classic 
Centralization of computing power 
51% attack -- reorganized the 
blockchain and allegedly permitted 




36 2019 DragonEx Loss or theft of private key 
Exchange hacked for undisclosed 
amount in several cryptocurrencies -- 
some assets retrieved 
Khatri, 2019 
Np: Date not provided in the article 
 
